From consumer gadgets to cars, China has time and again shown a knack for emulating cutting-edge foreign technology. Yet the semiconductors that power the digital economy have proven trickier to master. That has been the source of much anxiety among its political and business elites in recent years. America’s decision in 2022 to halt exports to the country of its whizziest chips and chipmaking tools brought into stark relief the chokehold of China’s geopolitical rivals over the industry. In December last year China’s imports of the lithography machines used to imprint circuits onto silicon wafers surged by 450%, compared with the previous year, as local chipmakers raced to buy advanced kit from ASML, the Dutch market leader, before export restrictions by the Netherlands came into effect in January.
Although the Chinese government has been splashing subsidies on its domestic chip industry for many years, mounting concern over the trade restrictions being imposed by America and its allies have led it to double down on the effort. In 2022 China’s government ramped up a national effort often referred to as the “Information Innovation” project, or xinchuang, that aims to replace foreign suppliers of, among other things, semiconductor technology. What’s more, whereas the state once pushed reluctant chipmakers to co-operate with local suppliers, their investors and boards now demand it as a form of insurance against trade wars. As a result, China’s semiconductor supply chain is steadily deepening. But can it ever match that of its rivals?
China’s chip industry operates under a shroud of secrecy. Breakthroughs and setbacks are often deemed to be state secrets, the divulgence of which can result in arrest. In August Huawei, a Chinese tech champion, shocked the world by producing a smartphone that contained a seven-nanometre (nm) chip, making it capable of 5G internet speeds. The company is now rumoured to be on the cusp of creating chips as small as 5nm, in partnership with SMIC, China’s largest foundry. Huawei’s Ascend chips, which the firm has designed for AI applications, are reportedly now being used by the likes of Baidu, a local search-engine giant and creator of Ernie, China’s answer to ChatGPT. Like Nvidia, America’s AI-chip champion, Huawei has developed a proprietary software platform, called CANN, that helps developers use its chips to build AI models.
All that still places China’s chip industry far from the technological frontier. Even if Huawei and SMIC succeed at producing 5nm chips, they will remain comfortably behind Samsung, a South Korean tech giant, and TSMC, a Taiwanese foundry, both of which began mass-producing 3nm chips in 2022. China’s lack of advanced lithography equipment will be a big barrier to further progress. In December a top shareholder in SMEE, China’s main hope in lithography, said on social media that the company’s machines had succeeded at producing 28nm chips—though it then quickly deleted the details, causing plenty of confusion. If true, that would still leave the company trailing ASML, whose top-of-the-line machines can produce 3nm chips.
Look away from the bleeding edge, however, and China is steadily chipping away at its reliance on foreign semiconductor technology. Huawei, which was burned in 2019 by sanctions that cut off its access to American technology, has been actively cultivating China’s wider chipmaking ecosystem. It is reportedly co-operating closely with a number of chip foundries, either by co-investing in projects or exchanging staff. In March last year it declared it had made a number of breakthroughs in the development of electronic-design-automation (EDA) software, used to generate blueprints for chips, which it said would free China’s industry from the need to rely on foreign suppliers of the tools for 14nm-and-larger semiconductors. Though unconfirmed, its collaborator on this is widely believed to be Empyrean, a Chinese maker of EDA tools whose sales have rocketed in recent years.
Such collaborations are happening more often. China’s foundries historically relied on importing tried and tested machinery from abroad. Now some of the largest, including SMIC, have become more open to testing local alternatives. That gives the suppliers a chance to receive feedback and improve their designs. Although this comes with significant costs—and risks—for the chipmakers, China’s government is thought to be easing the way by providing subsidies to those of them that purchase local equipment.
The upshot has been a big boost to Chinese manufacturers of chipmaking equipment. The domestic market share of Chinese producers of wafer-fabrication tools has risen from 4% in 2019 to an estimated 14% last year, according to Bernstein, a broker (see chart). AMEC, a Chinese firm whose machines are used to strip away residual material from a chip, controlled 10% of the Chinese market in 2021. Since then the company has been rapidly gaining share from foreign rivals such as America’s Lam Research (where its founder, Gerald Yin, used to work). Bernstein reckons AMEC’s market share reached 16% last year and will rise to around 30% by 2025. Naura, a peer, estimates its sales grew by 50% last year. Wazam, a Chinese supplier of the film used to insulate semiconductors, is beginning to make inroads, too, with a trial under way at a local chipmaker.
China has already pumped some $150bn of subsidies into its chipmaking industry over the past decade, according to a recent estimate by America’s Department of Commerce. The government, through various investments, is now present throughout the country’s semiconductor supply chain. SMIC is partially state-owned, as is AMEC. Empyrean is majority-owned by a state firm. The government of Shenzhen, the southern city where Huawei is based, invests in many of the chipmakers the company is working with. None of this is as efficient as relying on global supply chains. That shows that China’s officials have not efficiency but security in mind. And they have decided that the price is worth paying. ■